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Age, Earnings, Wealth, and Human Capital
Virtually all the implications of the theory of investment in human
capital developed in Part One depend directly or indirectly on the
effect of human capital on the earnings and productivity of persons
and firms. Consequently most of my empirical work has been concen-
trated on measuring and assessing these effects. Chapters IV through
VI contain the resultsfor various demographic groups and time
periods in the United States.
Several investigators have examined a variety of other implications,
and the additional empirical support given to the theory has been
quite gratifying.1 Thus Oi independently developed an analysis of
effect of investment in human capital on unemployment and turnover
that is quite similar to ours, and tested it empirically in a number of
ways.2 Smith applied the analysis to the turnover of skilled personnel
1Onecriticism was made of this theory largely on the grounds of lack of realism
and relevance (see R. S. Eckaus, "Investment in Human Capital: A Comment"
Journal of Political Economy, October 1963). Instead of quarreling with details of
his comment—and there are several that seem wrong or misleading—I would like to
urge that the evidence provided by this chapter and the previous ones, by the
studies mentioned here, and by many other studies indicates that the theory is quite
useful in interpreting the real world.
2 See Walter Y. Oi, "Labor as a Quasi-fixed Factor of Production," unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1961, and "Labor as a Quasi-fixed Factor,"
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in the military, and developed rules for increasing the efficiency of
their expenditures on personnel.3 Mincer applied the analysis in esti-
mating the amounts spent on on-the-job training, and then used his
estimates to understand the income and employment behavior of
different groups.4 In an earlier and pioneering article, Mincer had
already developed and tested a theory that related the distribution of
earnings to the distribution of investments in human capital.5 Or to
take a final and very different example, Clara Friedman has neatly
used the human capital approach to show that virtually nobody enters
the New York City public school teaching system with more than the
minimum required schooling because the value of the additional pay
given for additional schooling is less than the cost of postponed earn-
ings.6
This chapter covers still another aspect: the effect of human capital
on earnings and wealth at different ages. The first part deals with the
steepness and shape of the well-known age.earnings profiles. Since
these are relevant in studying the declining incomes of older persons
or the low incomes of younger persons, the effect of learning on pro.
ductivity, and many other life-cycle changes, a demonstration that
their shape is determined by investment in human capital should be
of considerable interest.
In recent years there has been a noticeable shift of emphasis in eco-
nomic theorizing and data collection from income and flows to capital
and stocks. This surely is the thrust of the permanent income and
related hypotheses in consumption studies,7 of the emphasis on the
allocation of assets in monetary theory,8 and of the attention paid to
the capital aspects of expenditures on durable goods.9 In line with
3 See G. Smith, "Differential Pay for Military Technicians," unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University, 1964.
4 See J. Mincer, "On-the-Job Training: Costs, Returns, and Some Implications,"
Investment in Human Beings, NBER Special Conference 15, supplement to Journal
of Political Economy, October 1962, pp. 50—59.
5 See his "Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution,"
Journal of Political Economy, August 1958.
6 See her "Differential Pay of New York City School Teachers," unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University, 1962.
7 See M. Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function, Princeton for NBER,
1957; and F. Modigliani and R. Brumberg, "Utility Analysis and the Consumption
Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data," in Post-Keynesian Economics,
K. K. Kurihara, ed., New Brunswick, 1954.
8 See J. Tobin, "Money, Capital and Other Stores of Value," American Economic
Review, May 1961; or M. Friedman, "The Quantity Theory of Money—A Restate-
ment," in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, M. Friedman, ed., Chicago,
1956.
9 See R. W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States, Princeton, 1955—
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this shift, life-cycle economic changes should be related not only or
even primarily to changes in earnings and other income, but also to
changes in human and other wealth. Accordingly, the second part of
this chapter develops the concept of age-wealth profiles—the relation
between age and the discounted value of subsequent earnings—and
shows that their shape, like that of the underlying age-earnings pro-
file, is determined by investment in human capital. A few applications
illustrating the usefulness of age-wealth profiles and thus indirectly
the importance of human capital conclude the discussion.
1. Age-Earnings Profiles
Table 19 shows the mean net after-tax incomes in 1989 and 1949 of
males classified by age and years of schooling; the word "net" mdi.
TABLE 19
Net After-Tax Incomes of White Males in 1939



































































Source: See Tables 2 and 3 and Appendix A, section 1.
aFor1939, 7 and 8 years of schooling; for 1949, 8 years.AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES 217
cates that direct outlays on schooling have been subtracted from re-
ported incomes. Although the analysis in this chapter does not at all
depend on the use of such an income concept, I have done so because
foregone income—an important part of the total cost of education—is
implicitly subtracted from reported incomes- Economic analysis as
well as consistent accounting would be made easier either if direct
outlays were also subtracted or if foregone income was added back.
Since the discussion in Chapter II indicates that all the costs of gen-
eral on-the-job training and of certain other investments are implicitly
subtracted from reported incomes, comparability among different
kinds of human capital is most easily achieved by explicitly subtract-
ing direct school outlays, which brings us to the net income concept
used in Table 19.
The table clearly shows that average incomes at each age class are
strongly related to education, a relation explored in the previous
chapters. The table also shows that incomes tend to be relatively low
at the beginning of labor force participation, rise throughout later
ages until a common peak is reached in the 45 to 54 age class, and
decline in the last age class. Although the peaks are reached in the
same class, they are not necessarily reached at the same age. For ex-
ample, if incomes continually increased to the peak age and continu-
ally declined thereafter, actual peak ages could be anywhere from 35
to 64, a spread of thirty years, and yet all the observed peaks might
occur in the 45 to 54 age class.
Therefore, these data do not necessarily contradict the common
notion that unskilled persons reach their peak earnings before skilled
persons. This notion has been based, however, on misleading statistics.
Since occupation changes with age, the more able tending to rise and
the less able to fall in the occupational hierarchy, earnings in differ-
ent occupations at a given moment in time might show an earlier
peak in unskilled occupations merely because older unskilled workers
are less able than younger ones. Education statistics are less affected
because education is usually completed at an early age. r
Table 19 gives the incomes of different cohorts at a moment in
time, not those of a given cohort aging over time. Age-income profiles
based on longitudinal or time series data can differ from those based
on cross-sectional data because of business cycles, secular trends toward
higher education, and occupation or life-cycle employment changes
(see the discussion in the beginning of Chapter IV). Probably the most
important, pervasive, and calculable difference results, however, from
the secular growth in incomes, which implies, for example, that the218 AGE, EARNINGS, WEALTH, AND HUMAN CAPITAL
cohort of college graduates aged 25 in 1939 received a higher real in-
come at age 35 than did the èohort aged 35 in 1939. Since secular
growth in the United States has been large, averaging almost 2 per
cent per person per annum, the difference would be considerable.
The cross-sectional education profiles have been converted into time
series profiles only by adjusting very simply for the secular growth in
incomes. The income t years later of a cohort finishing its schooling
in a base year was estimated by multiplying the base year income of
the cohort with the same schooling and t years older by (l.02)t, where
2 per cent is the assumed average annual growth in incomes. For
example, the cohort of college graduates aged 35 to 44 in 1939 had an
income of $3400, and the estimated income at age 35 of a cohort
graduating from college in 1939 at age 22 would be $3400 multiplied
by (l.02)'8. Chart 10 plots such time series profiles for college, high-
school, and elementary-school graduates of 1939.
This adjustment for secular growth is inaccurate on several counts.
Although 2 per cent is a good estimate of the average growth in real
per capita income since the 1880s, the growth during the last twenty-
five years, especially in after-tax incomes, has been less. Moreover,
Chapter VI suggests that incomes of less-educated persons grew more
rapidly before 1940 and possibly less rapidly after 1940 than those of
more educated persons. Consequently, a more accurate adjustment of
recent data would have a lower average rate of growth and different
rates at different educational levels. Since, however, none of the con-
clusions reached in this chapter would be greatly affected, I have re-
tained a simple 2 per cent adjustment. The rate of return estimates
in Chapters IV through VI are more sensitive, and different adjust.
ments were tried there.
The profiles in Chart 10 do not decline at older ages, but continue
to rise through age 65, the last age covered by the data. This perhaps
surprising conclusion can be checked with data from surveys taken at
different times, which provide an independent measure of the change
over time in a cohort's income. For example, college graduates aged
45 to 54 in 1939 would be 55 to 64 years old in 1949, and the real in-
comes of 45- to 54-year-old college graduates in the 1940 Census could
be compared with those of 55- to 64-year-old college graduates in the
1950 Census. Such evidence is not altogether reliable since the income
concept is not the same in different surveys, sampling and response
errors abound, and so on; nevertheless, it can serve as a check. Table
20, which brings together data from the 1940 and 1950 Census, and
from a Census survey in 1958, indicates that a cohort's income in-
creases more with age than is shown by cross-section data. In particu-AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES
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lar, there is no systematic tendency for time series profiles to decline
in the last age class even though cross-section ones do.10 The decline
in the latter has been responsible for an erroneous inference about the
10 The result may be due to selective retirement before the age of 65, since persons
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TABLE 20
Estimated Incomes over Time of Cohorts




Income of Cohort in
1939 1949 1958
COLLEGE GRAD UA TES
25—34 5155 8960 12,269
35—44 8386 11,543 10,966




25—34 3699 4812 6295
35—44 5380 5770 6510
45—54 5933 5798 —
55—64 5464 —
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL GRADUATES
25—34 2848 3610 4337
35—44 3823 3896 3960
45—54 4182 3586 —
55—64 3833 — —
Source: Tables 2 and 3 and Appendix A, section 1.
shape of the former" which has made for misunderstanding of the
economic position of older workers. For example, their retirement at
65 has been misinterpreted because their earnings have been as-
sumed to be way below their peak earnings rather than possibly higher
than ever.
The time series and cross-section profiles would be identical in a
11WhetherMarshall's statement that occupation profiles eventually turn down
held for time series profiles in nineteenth-century England is not clear. Many related
statements for the United States, however, make no allowance for growth and thus
incorrectly jump from cross-section data to a longitudinal inference. To take one of
many possible examples, H. Miller said, "When he [the average male worker] is
in his forties or early fifties he has usually attained the peak of his earning power,
and from that time until he is ready to retire from the labor market his annual
earnings shrink until they are not any higher than those he received as a young
-man"(Income of the American People, New York, 1955, p. 64). He then refers to
cross-section data that would not decline (at least up to the age of 65) if adjusted for
the annual growth in earnings.AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES 221
stationary economy since they differ only because of the growth in
per capita earnings. If growth were due to the operation of forces,
like neutral technological changes, that uniformly raised earnings at
all ages, cross-sectional profiles would be unaffected, while time series
profiles would decline to the former if growth ceased. If, on the other
hand, growth were due to the embodiment of new technology in
younger (that is, "newer") workers, or to other improvements in the
economic effects of the human capital invested in successive cohorts
with the same number of school years, cross-sectional profiles would
be affected by growth and would approach the shape of the time series
profiles if growth ceased. For example, if new technology were em-
bodied in younger workers, they would have greater technological
knowledge than older workers, so cross-sectional profiles would under-
state, while time series profiles would accurately measure, the effect of
age on the earnings of workers with the same technological knowledge.
So even though the time series profiles were derived from cross-
sectional ones by adjusting for growth, they may more accurately
describe the relation between age and earnings in a stationary econ-
omy. In particular, earnings may not decline before age 65 even in
such an economy.
Although all the profiles in Chart 10 rise continuously, they do so
at very different rates, the average rate of increase being positively
related to education. This is apparent from the lines connecting in-
comes at ages 14 to 21 with those at 55 to 64, for they have slopes of
15, 7, and 5.5 per cent, respectively, for college, high-school, and ele-
mentary-school graduates. The analysis in Part One indicated that
investment in human capital steepens age-earnings profiles because
earnings are net of investment costs at younger ages and gross of
returns at older ages. Indeed, the proposition could be turned around
and if two profiles differed in steepness, the steeper could be said to
indicate the presence of greater human capital. Consequently, the
positive relation between steepness and education in Chart 10 seems to
support this approach.
It does, but note that the data plotted there include the effects of
all investments in human capital, including vocational and on-the-job
training, health, knowledge of economic opportunities, and so forth,
as well as education. College graduates could have more education than
high-school graduates and less total capital because, for example, the
latter had more on-the-job and vocational training. If so, high-school
graduates would have lower net earnings at younger ages, higher
earnings later on, and a steeper profile than college graduates. Since the
contrary is indicated, the main inference must be that there is a posi-222 AGE, EARNINGS, WEALTH, AND HUMAN CAPITAL
tive correlation between education and total capital.12 This inference
is quite sensible because education is presumably an important part of
the total, and other kinds of investment in human capital, such as
health, migration, adult education, and on-the-job training, appear to
be positively related to education (see Chapter 1V section 2).
TABLE 21
Annual Rates of Income Change between Successive Age Classes






















































Source: The data plotted in Chart 10. The entries are computed from the
formula±
X whereYg is income at age t,andis income at
age 1'.
The entries in Table 21 bring out precisely what should be appar-
ent from even a cursory glance at Chart 10; namely, the profiles are
quite concave to the age axis, especially at younger ages and higher
educational levels. The concavity is shown by the continual decline in
annual rates of increase between successive age classes, the declines
being strongest at younger ages and higher educational levels. In
addition, rates of increase of earnings with age differ appreciably only
at younger ages; for example, the rate of increase is 30 percentage
points higher for college than for elementary-school graduates between
ages 18 and 25, while they increase at about the same rate between
40 and 60.
The theory developed in Part One also explains these results re-
markably well. Earnings are depressed "artificially" during the in-
12 The net earnings of young persons in Chart 10 are overestimated because the
direct costs of certain 'investments (such as migration and health) do not tend to be
subtracted from earnings. The overestimateis probably not too large, however,
because many direct costs (such as on-the-job training and education) are subtracted,
and indirect costs are usually more important than direct costs. Moreover, earnings
at older ages would include the return on all investments, and they are clearly
directly related to education.AGE-WEALTH PROFILES 22S
vestment period because costs are written off then, and rise unusually
rapidly afterward because the depressantisreleased. A concave
age-earnings profile results, especially near the investment period
which is concentrated at younger ages. Since the total amount invested
is positively correlated with education, more-educated cohorts would
have more concave profiles, again especially at younger ages. So a
simple theory of investment in human capital can explain the dif-
ferences in concavity as well as in steepness.
2. Age-Wealth Profiles
As pointed out in the introduction, in recent years there has been a
shift in both theoretical and empirical work from flows to stocks,
which suggests that, in studying life-cycle behavior, attention should
be paid to age-wealth profiles as well as to the more familiar age-
earnings profiles. This section discusses the influence of investment in
human capital on the shape of age and human-wealth profiles (little
direct attention is paid to nonhuman wealth).
Although the market value of human wealth cannot be determined
directly because, happily, there no longer is a market in human
beings, an indirect estimate can be based on the rule that the value
of an asset equals the discounted sum of the income stream yielded.
In others words, the value of the human wealth "owned" at a par-
ticular age would equal the discounted sum of subsequent earnings.
So the shape of the relation between age and the discounted sum of
subsequent earnings, which is called an age-wealth profile, would be
completely determined by interest rates and the shape of age-earnings
profiles.
If interest rates were zero, age-wealth profiles would decline con-
tinuously because wealth would simply be the sum of subsequent
earnings and, consequently, would have to decline with age regard-
less of the shape of age-earnings profiles.13 If interest rates were infi-
nitely large, wealth and earnings profiles would be identical; in par-
ticular, the former would rise as long as the latter did. With interest
rates between these extremes, wealth profiles would peak somewhere
between the initial and the peak earnings age, closer to the latter the
higher the rates.14
13 More precisely, they would rise only during periods of negative earnings. Since
net earnings could be negative only during the investment period, even these rises
would be at younger ages.
14 See section 2 of Appendix B.
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CHART 11
AGE, EARNINGS, WEALTH, AND HUMAN CAPITAL
Age-Wealth Profiles of 1939 Graduates
Note: Earnings discounted at an 8 per cent rate.
Although time series profiles are clearly more relevant in calculating
cohort wealth profiles than cross-sectional ones are, even the former
have to be modified because they consider only the earnings of cohort
members alive and participating in the labor force. They could be con-
verted into the relevant cohort profiles with an adjustment for the frac-
tion not participating at different ages. Since participation declines
with age, the differences between time series and cohort profiles would
be greater at older ages, especially at lower educational levels; in par-
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ticular, the latter profiles would tend to turn down before age 65
even though the former did not. The peak in cohort earnings would
be later, however, than that in cross-sectional earnings.
If a cohort earnings profile did not rise much, the wealth profile
would necessarily decline continuously, at least if interest rates did
not decline much with age. If earnings rose sufficiently, wealth would
also rise, and the rate of increase in wealth would be positively related
to, yet less than, that in earnings. Although wealth necessarily peaks
before earnings, the peak wealth age would be later, the greater the
increase and the later the peak in earnings.15 Since the increase in
earnings is related to investment in human capital, the increase in
wealth and its peak age would also be related to this investment.
Chart 11 illustrates these effects by graphing the wealth profiles of
the 1939 cohorts of college, high-school, and elementary-school male
graduates.16 All earnings have been discounted at an 8 per cent interest
rate, about the average rate of return on business capital (see section 1
of Chapter V). Time series earnings were only adjusted for mortality,
still by far the major cause of nonparticipation before age 65.
All the wealth profiles rise for about the first twenty years of labor
force participation and then decline. The rates of increase are posi-
tively related to education, although the differences here are smaller
than those in earnings. Wealth peaks at about age 39, some fifteen
years before cohort earnings do. The peaks in wealth are not much
affected by education because neither the peaks in earnings nor their
rates of increase after the early thirties are much affected by education
(see Table 21).
Investment in human capital explains not only these differences in
wealth profiles, but also changes over time. For example, in the early
nineteenth century wealth profiles usually peaked quite early, say at
age 20 or so,17 because mortality was high and workers were usually
relativelyunskilled.Unskilled workers with high mortality rates
16 For proofs of these assertions, see sections 2 through 4 of Appendix B.
16 Chart 11 was computed from earnings figures that are slightly different from and
presumably less accurate than those used in section 1. Since the more correct figures
would yield very similar wealth profiles, I have not bothered to make any corrections.
17 The value of a typical male Negro slave rose until he was in his early twenties,
reached a peak there, and then declined for the rest of his life. (See R. Evans, Jr.,
"The Economics of American Negro Slavery, 1880—1860," Aspects of Labor Eco-
nomics, Special Conference 14, Princeton for NBER, 1962, Table 12.) Since the
value of slaves was determined by maintenance costs as well as productivity, the peak
in the present value of subsequent productivity would have come still earlier, unless,
as is unlikely, maintenance costs rose significantly during the late teens and early
twenties. The present value of the earnings of unskilled free persons probably
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would have a flat or even declining (cohort) earnings profile,'8 and
thus a continually declining wealth profile. The heavy investment in
education, training, and health during the past hundred years has
steepened the typical earnings profile and, consequently, shifted the
typical peak wealth age to about
Before concluding, it might be wise to consider explicitly some ap-
plications of wealth profiles since they are less well known than
earnings profiles and their importance may not be obvious to many
readers. Two applications were chosen for their interest and time-
liness. The first deals with the need to provide depreciation on
human as well as physical capital and the second with life-cycle vari-
ations in savings.20
Many persons have suggested that a term accounting for the depre-
ciation of human beings be subtracted from reported earnings. Irving
Fisher, in his brilliant presentation of the conceptual foundations of
the income and wealth concepts, said: "If it were true that income
could never trench on capital, we could not reckon a laboring man's
wages as income without first deducting a premium or sinking fund
sufficient to provide for the continuance of this income after the
destruction by death of the laborer." 21 If by "laboring man" is meant
relatively unskilled, as seems reasonable, then Fisher's conclusion is
supported by my analysis of age-wealth profiles. Since their earnings
profile would not rise much with age, their wealth profile would
tend to decline continuously. Wealth could be maintained constant,
therefore, only if the rate of decline in wealth was subtracted from
earnings at the same age and added to a depreciation or sinking fund.
In recent years emphasis has shifted from the laboring man to the
educated man and from conceptual issues to more practical ones.
Tax laws are said to discriminate against education and other kinds
18 There is some evidence that the productivity of male Negro slaves did not
change much between their twenties and fifties (see J. R. Meyer and A. H. Conrad,
"The Economics of Slavery in the Ante Bellum South," Journal of Political Economy,
April1958, P. 106).
19 For example, the profiles plotted in Chart 9 would have peaked several years
earlier if mortality rates of the middle-nineteenth century had been used.
20 I omit possibly the most well-known application, namely, to the relation be-
tween age and life insurance. This stimulated the pioneering book by L. Dublin
and A. Loika, The Money Value of a Man, New York, 1930, revised in 1940. Also see
B. Weisbrod, "The Valuation of Human Capital," Journal of Political Economy,
October 1961, Pp. 425—436. A related application is to damage suits resulting from
disability or death. An absorbing example is given in the best seller by L. Nizer,
My Life in Court, New York, 1961, Chapter 5, section II, entitled "The Worth of a
Man."
21 Nature of Capital and Income, New York, 1930, p. 111. Fisher, however, argued
against the use of this "ideal" definition of income.AGE-WEALTH PROFILES 227
of human capital because depreciation can be deducted only from
the taxable income of physical capital.22 Unquestionably, a more
symmetrical tax treatment of these two classes of capital would be
desirable. However, one should be aware that a good deal of depre-
ciation on human capital occurs unknowingly. Thus, as pointed out
elsewhere, part of the costs of human capital are "written off" imme-
diately because foregone earnings are, in effect, deducted from accrued
taxable income.23 Since these indirect costs are about 75 per cent of
the private costs of college education in the United States,24 and an
even higher percentage of general on-the-job training costs, the depre-
ciation unknowingly permitted is considerable. Indeed, the present
value of the amount so permitted would often be greater than that
explicitly allowed on physical assets depreciated over a five- or ten-year
or even longer period!
Some important relations between depreciation and human capital
can be obtained using age-wealth profiles if true income were simply
defined as the amount necessary to keep wealth intact.25 Then the
depreciation or "appreciation" necessary to convert reported into true
earnings would simply equal the rate of change in wealth. Conse-
quently, the depreciation could be said to be insufficient whenever
wealth declined and excessive whenever it increased.
Since the wealth profile of unskilled workers would decline con-
tinuously, an explicit depreciation deduction is needed at each work-
ing age. The profiles of skilled workers, on the other hand, rise for a
spell and the rises are larger and steeper, the greater the investment
in human capital. Consequently, since their true earnings would
actually be greater than reported earnings at younger ages and less
only after the peak wealth age, an appreciation term would be re-
quired at all ages before the peak in wealth. So while tax laws can
be said to discriminate against all unskilled and older skilled workers,
they discriminate in favorofyounger skilled workers. Of course, dur.
ing the whole period of labor force participation there would be a
net decline even in the wealth of skilled workers. But it would be
relatively small: for example, using an 8 per cent interest rate, the
average annual depreciation in the wealth of workers with a flat
earnings profile (during an assumed forty-two-year earning period)
22 See T. W. Schultz, "Investment in Human Capital," American Economic Re-
view, March 1961, p. 18, and R. Goode, "Educational Expenditures and the Income
Tax," in Economics of Higher Education, S. J. Mushkin, ed., Washington, 1962.
23 See Chapter II, section 1, and Chapter V. section 1.
24 See Chapter IV, section 1.
25 Such an ideal definition is not necessary for our purposes, but it does simplify
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would equal 30 per cent of average earnings while that of the 1939
cohort of college graduates would equal only 18 per cent of their
earnings.26
So death rather than investment in human capital appears to be
the main reason why reported earnings, on the whole, overestimate
true earnings. When the former isthe principal determinant of
wealth changes, as with unskilled workers, depreciation bulks large
relative to earnings, but when the latter is more important, as with
skilled workers, depreciation becomes less important. Probably the
major explanation of this paradoxical conclusion is that much de-
preciation is unknowingly permitted on human capital.
In recent years studies of household behavior have been greatly in-
fluenced by the argument that current expenditures depend not only
on current income but also on expected future income.27 In particular,
total consumption at any age would be affected by expectations about
incomes at later ages. So variations in consumption would
not match those in earnings because the latter would be at least partly
anticipated and then offset by appropriate savings and dissavings.28 It
shall be demonstrated that this new approach makes life-cycle changes
in savings a function of age-wealth profiles and thus indirectly of the
amount invested in human capital.
A lifetime consumption pattern is assumed to depend upon utility
functions, expectations about earnings and other income, market
interest rates, and planned bequests. Since savings are residually de.
fined as the difference between income and consumption, savings are
adjusted over a lifetime so as to make the consumption plan feasible.
In particular, since earnings are high during the middle ages and
low during the younger ages and retirement, the rate of savings would
also be high during the middle ages and low or even negative during
other periods. Broadly speaking, this pattern is usually found in
empirical studies.29
More precise implications can be obtained by specifying the model
more fully. In order to bring out clearly and simply the effects of
26 See section 5 of Appendix B for a more general result.
27 See especially Friedman, Consumption Function.
28 This approach to life-cycle consumption patterns has been stressed by F.
Modigliani and his associates. See Modigliani and Brumberg, in Post-Keynesian
Economics, or F. Modigliani and A. Ando, "The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Savings."
American Economic Review, March 1963.
29 See Friedman, Consumption Function, Tables 8 and 9, and F. Modigliani and
A. Ando, "The 'Permanent Income' and the 'Life Cycle' Hypothesis of Saving
Behavior: Comparison and Tests," in Consumption and Saving,I.Friend and
R. Jones, eds., Vol. II, Philadelphia, 1960, Table 111.4.AGE-WEALTH PROFILES 229
human capital, several assumptions will be added that certainly have
to be modified in a more complete analysis. Thus, let it be assumed
that each cohort knows its earnings profile, that a single market inter-
est rate applies to all transactions, that consumption is the same at all
ages, and that after entry jnto the labor force the nonhuman wealth
of a cohort can be changed only by its own savings and dissavings.3°
Each cohort starts out with wealth, partly in earning power and
partly in property, and at "its" death leaves behind wealth, partly
in the earning power of descendants and other subsequent cohorts
and partly in property.
If its bequest, or terminal wealth, equaled the amount it was be-
quested, or initial wealth—that is, if there were zero generational or
"social" savings—the rate of savings31 at any age would exactly equal
the rate of change of human wealth.32 So savings would be negative
from the initial to the peak human-wealth age, zero then,33 positive
at subsequent ages until retirement, and zero during retirement. A
more reasonable assumption for the United States and other devel-
oped economies would be that social savings were positive, or that
terminal wealth exceeded initial wealth. Then the initial dissavings
would be smaller and of shorter duration, the zero savings rate would
be reached before the peak wealth age, and a positive savings rate
would continue into the retirement period.
Since the wealth profile of unskilled workers would decline con-
tinuously, they would have positive savings throughout their labor
force period. Profiles of workers with investment in human capital,
on the other hand, rise initially more sharply and longer, the greater
the investment. So the magnitude and extent of the initial dissavings
would be greater for cohorts with more human capital.
Since an initial period of dissavings would result in an initial de-
cline in nonhuman capital, an increase in indebtedness, or some of
both,34 the large secular increase in human capital should have
caused a secular increase in household indebtedness. Therefore, the
30 These assumptions, as well as several others, are also made by Modigliani etal.
intheir quantitative work.
31 Note that our concept of savings, unlike the usual ones, includes investment in
the human capital of subsequent generations as well as accumulation of assets.
32 In terms of the language just used, savings would equal the rate of depreciation
or appreciation on wealth.
33 Before retirement, only at the peak wealth age would permanent income,
defined as the income accruing on wealth, equal actual income. So depreciation and
thus savings equal zero when actual and permanent incomes are equal.
34 Consequently, one can say that investment in human capital is substituted for
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observed increase in consumer credit and other debt may not have
resulted simply from an increased demand for durables or from
improvements in the market for credit, but probably also was a dis-
guised effect of the secular increase in education and other human
capital.
A change in the rate of population growth would probably change
aggregate, although not necessarily social, savings because the rela-
tive number of persons at different ages would be affected. If savings
rates were always greater at younger than at older ages, an increase in
population growth would increase the aggregate savings rate. Such
would tend to be the result in a world of unskilled workers because
they would save more throughout the labor force period than during
retirement.35 Skilled workers, on the other hand, would have low and
even negative savings rates at the youngest ages, and a larger popula.
tion growth rate might actually reduce their aggregate savings rate.
Therefore, the secular increase in human capital should have reduced
the positive effect of a higher population growth rate on aggregate
savings, and might even have led to a negative effect.
35 This essentially is the model assumed by Kuznets in his discussion of the effect
of population growthon aggregate savings. See his Capital in the American Econ-
omy: Its Formation arid Financing, Princeton for NBER, 1061, Chapter IlL Also see
Modigliani and Ando in American Economic Review, March 1963, pp. 59—60.